Sun Wu held war to be a matter of vital state importance and treated it as a field where political, economic and geographic factors are tied together, a base of Chinese military thought.

Spring and Autumn period to present
118 BCE · EvolutionBamboo slips of The Art of War came out of the Han tomb at Yinqueshan, Linyi, Shandong; Huang Pumin of Renmin University of China says in Chinese Social Sciences Today that the burial dates between the first year of Jianyuan (140 BCE) and the fifth year of Yuanshou (118 BCE), and that the Han-slip text is the earliest hand copy found so far.1080 · ImpactIn 1080 the Song court collated and printed the Sunzi with other military classics.1972 · ImpactIn 1972 the bamboo slips of the Yinqueshan Han tomb were unearthed; collated with the received text, the Han-slip Art of War shows variants such as “in defense there is more than enough, in attack there is not enough,” and a different chapter order.

The weight of The Art of War lies not in teaching people how to win but in first making one thing clear: what war is, whether it should be fought, and when it is worth the cost. This way of speaking entered the histories and the state schools, and later readers drew different readings from it; its weight lies in those steps.

The book and the man first appear in the Records of the Grand Historian, in the Biography of Sunzi and Wu Qi: “Sunzi Wu was a man of Qi. He presented his art of war to King Helu of Wu. Helu said: 'Your thirteen chapters I have read in full.'” Sun Wu then became a general and “in the west broke mighty Chu and entered Ying, in the north overawed Qi and Jin, and made his name known among the lords; Sunzi had a share in it.” Cao Cao, who wrote a commentary, says in his preface: “I have read many books of war and strategy, and what Sun Wu wrote is the deepest.” The preface also says “the sages used arms by keeping them sheathed and moving only in season, using them only when there was no choice,” which fixes “no choice” as the way to read the book from the outset. This end joins Records of the Grand Historian: Sima Qian placed a book of war inside one man's biography, so that later readers meet the man before the book.

The book argues, first, that war should be put where it can be calculated. Its first chapter opens: “War is the great affair of the state, the ground of life and death, the road to survival or ruin, and must be examined,” and goes on to “assess it by five matters, compare by estimates, and seek out the facts.” Second, it admits that war involves deception: “war is the way of deceit.” Third, it sets limits everywhere: “To win a hundred battles in a hundred is not the best of the best; to subdue the enemy without fighting is the best of the best”; “the best is to attack the enemy's plans, next to attack his alliances, next to attack his army, and the worst is to attack walled cities”; “there has never been a state that profited from a long war”; “the ruler must not raise an army in anger, nor the general fight in rage,” for “a ruined state cannot be restored, and the dead cannot be brought back.” Fourth, it values intelligence: “foreknowledge cannot be had from spirits or gods, from analogy with events, or from calculation; it must be got from men who know the enemy's situation.” Knowledge of the enemy is not asked of the spirits; it has to be found out by people.

The book spread widely. The Hanfeizi, in “The Five Vermin,” complains: “Everyone within the borders speaks of war, every house keeps the books of Sun and Wu, yet the army grows weaker.” It is a reproach, but as Han Fei writes it, the books of Sun and Wu were already widely kept; in the debates described in Masters' Prose, books of war had a place too. In the year 1972 bamboo slips came out of the Han tomb at Yinqueshan. Huang Pumin of Renmin University of China says in the Chinese Social Sciences Today that the tomb dates to between 140 and 118 BCE and that the Han-slip text is the earliest hand copy found so far. It differs from the received text: the received text reads “in defense there is not enough, in attack there is more than enough,” the Han slips read “in defense there is more than enough, in attack there is not enough”; the received text's chapter order begins with the “Estimates” chapter and ends with “On the Use of Spies,” while the Han slips begin with “Estimates” and end with “Attack by Fire,” which Huang takes to stress the principle that “war is dire and perilous” and to seem closer to what Sunzi intended. Yet in the same article he says that the received text is the definitive version that Liu Xiang, Ren Hong and others finally produced by collating many old copies, that “its quality should surpass the Han-slip text,” and that the Han slips are “worth consulting, but should not be trusted too blindly”; and he treats a received reading such as “in defense there is not enough, in attack there is more than enough” as “an error introduced in the course of later copying from hand to hand.” These variants show that a book was read again and again as it was copied, and was altered and collated too.

It entered state learning in the Song. The Xu Zizhi Tongjian Changbian, volume 303, records for the third year of Yuanfeng (1080): “An edict ordered the collation and printing from blocks of Sunzi, Wuzi, the Liutao, the Sima Fa, the Sanlüe, Weiliaozi and the Questions and Replies of Li Jing,” and Wei Hong, a special researcher of the China Policy Science Research Association, says this is the Seven Military Classics. He also says that after the military school and military examinations were set up, Sunzi and Wuzi became textbooks, and the study of war acquired institutional support for study, examination and appointment; he also criticizes the Song turn of military learning toward Confucian values, which fixed an order of “Confucianism as root, military matters as branch” and often made “caution in war” an excuse for “avoiding war.” State learning brought spread, and also brought constraint.

It is bound up with other canons. Sun Bin, a later descendant of Sun Wu, in his “Ten Formations” treats the square, round and sparse formations among others, and Huang Pumin and Xiong Jianping write in the China Reading Weekly that when Qi Jiguang trained troops he required his men to “recite the plain text of the Seven Military Classics in order” and carried Sunzi's “temple calculation” down to the level of campaign command; this line runs to Weapons & Formations. In Thirty-Six Stratagems, the “besiege Wei to rescue Zhao” stratagem has a note quoting what Sun Bin said to Tian Ji, and the note on “wait at ease for the weary” quotes exactly the “Weak Points and Strong” chapter: “whoever occupies the ground first and waits for the enemy is at ease, and whoever comes late and rushes into battle is weary.”

Without this book, Chinese military affairs would lack a body of reasoning that could be questioned: whether to fight, how to fight and how far to go would be decided by a commander's nerve alone.

The Art of War is about fighting, yet everywhere it speaks of not fighting: “to subdue the enemy without fighting” is the best of the best, and “a ruined state cannot be restored,” so a ruler must not raise an army in anger. Cao Cao fixed “no choice” as the way to read it, Han Fei complained that many houses kept the books of Sun and Wu while the army grew weaker, Huang Pumin weighs the strengths of the Yinqueshan slips and the received text from both sides, the edict of the third year of Yuanfeng had it collated and printed, and Qi Jiguang made his men recite it in order. Read, taught, collated and also questioned, the book set war in a place where it could be calculated, limited and called to account.

The Art of War is the class in the chapter on Strategies on the book of war. It covers the thirteen chapters of Sun Wu: presented to King Helü of Wu in the late Spring and Autumn period, already widely copied in the early Western Han, and placed first among the Seven Military Classics in the Northern Song. Sun Wu treated war as a great matter touching politics, the economy and the lie of the land.

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